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I. Prelude
"Therefore, determine the enemy's plans and you will know which strategy will be successful and which will not; agitate him and ascertain the pattern of his movement. Determine his dispositions and so ascertain the field of battle." -Sun Tzu The Art of War 02NOV070630L: It is an early morning in the Oruzgan Province, Afghanistan. The sun is starting to rise, with the chill of winter beginning to set in. Snow is falling several clicks north of Jaguar 01's current position. Jaguar 01 is the combat controller embedded with the Army Special Forces (SF) team operating in the area. They are closely coordinating and conducting missions with members of the Afghan National Army (ANA). Existing intelligence is warning that a major attack by the Taliban is likely in the area. The insurgents are looking to have one final, successful campaign prior to recapitalizing during the winter months. Intelligence points to a Taliban plot to overrun a Forward Operating Base (FOB) in the area, killing all American and Afghanistan military members and eradicating the local base of operations.
It has been a long night for the combined SF-ANA team. They are traveling back in a 20-vehicle convoy to their FOB. They have just finished with a mission, attempting to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people. The birds initiate the first signs of a new day as they alight into the sky, while the SF-ANA team surveys a local village half a click to the east. The sun breaks the mountaintops as a rocket propelled grenade (RPG) impacts one of the Humvees.
A huge explosion engulfs the vehicle, and the soldiers within. Suddenly, the peaceful morning has turned into an ambush from hell. The wadi they are travelling through has become a deathtrap. Numerous, disparate avenues of enemy fire converge on their position. Bullets, RPGs and mortars begin to rain down on the convoy. The SF-ANA teams quickly dismount, and begin returning fire on the insurgents, but the noose of the Anti-Coalition Militia (ACM) ambush begins to tighten. Jaguar 01 is immediately in contact with the FOB. The mountainous terrain hampers communications, but Jaguar 11, the primary point of contact at the FOB, understands the gist of the need. A flight of F-15Es, Dude 03/04, launches from Bagram Air Base, and at faster than the speed of sound, they rocket southbound to provide close air support (CAS) to the friendly position. The Theater Operations Center (TOC) at the FOB notifies the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) that Jaguar 01 has issued a troops-in-contact (TIC). The TOC dispatches all available resources to support the beleaguered allied forces.
02NOV071000L:
Time is against the SF-ANA team. The insurgents are coordinating the attack using multiple avenues of fire, and the Taliban are using a shoot-and-scoot technique, not staying in any one location for more than ten minutes. To make matters worse, the wadi is wet this time of year, and so the convoy has numerous Humvees stuck in the mud and grass. The F15Es arrive on station to provide close air support, and Jaguar 01 is in charge of directing the friendly fires. The air-ground coordination falls back on the expert training perfected in the fires of combat. Dude 03 and Jaguar 01 pass CAS 9-lines and targeting solutions back and forth. Jaguar 01 targets Dude 03 against the first sets of Taliban, but the enemy's ground attack continues to build.
Then the bomb hits the radios waves: "Jaguar 11, Jaguar 01, be advised that we have one American and one ANA, KIA." An American and an ally have been killed. During this entire incident, an American Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) platform has been flying overhead, collecting the information on the enemy, their locations, and their actions. Not once during this unfortunate event did the ISR platform provide any direct support to Jaguar 01, Dude flight, the SF team or the ANA soldiers.
II. Introduction
The advancement of aerial reconnaissance drastically changes the face of war, and is a keystone to modern day operations. Without the use of real-time aerial reconnaissance, the lack of near real time, actionable information severely hampers the effectiveness of the U.S. military forces in combat. Command and Control, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C2ISR) make up the backbone of battle management and situational awareness that is required in today's wars. The major limiting factor in aerial reconnaissance is the ability to provide realtime, actionable intelligence directly to the ground forces, in an expeditious manner.
Maximizing the capabilities while decentralizing execution of electronic warfare support (ES) platforms, enables a more effective, real-time dissemination of pertinent actionable intelligence directly to the ground commander, in support of irregular warfare (IW). This paper outlines the advancement of reconnaissance and its changing effect to not only the tactical character of warfare, but also the way the United States and her allies wage war. This paper discusses numerous authors' thoughts on how reconnaissance has changed the face of war, and then applies thought on how to better utilize reconnaissance to fight war today. The paper covers recommendations to increase the direct support roles of ES platforms. Finally, the paper summarizes the recent trends in reconnaissance missions and forecast how the ES role will affect current and future conflict. and what authority and power they have garnered for themselves or their community they are extremely reluctant to part with. Proprietary personnel think solely of their own "rice bowls" and needs, and do not realize that by agreeing to give up a portion of their authority and centralized control, they not only improve their own capabilities to accomplish their goals, but also empower the Joint community to maximize their effectiveness to accomplish the mission.
Who tasks or controls the collection assets, what the planners task them to provide, and how the assets will support those tasked requirements determine the distinction between ISR and AU/ACSC/BABCOCK/AY09 Upon execution, the planners direct the crewmembers aboard the ES platforms not to deviate from predetermined orbits. The reason provided is that the planners have maximized orbit location for the pre-allocated target sets of the day. If only five of those targets are active, the planning branch of the operations center appears to not want the tactical experts onboard those same platforms to make any real-time changes to maximize capabilities of which only the onboard tacticians have insight into.
III. Historical Reconnaissance Perspective
Following the conclusion of WWII, an era of possible Armageddon began, based on the different ideologies of the United States and the Soviet Union. This differing in principles resulted in the possibility of a new and more terrifying war. With the buildup of nuclear weapons on both sides of the world, and the political stigma of mutually assured destruction,
knowledge of exactly what the enemy was doing, where the weak points of the country lie, and how best to defeat the enemy's defenses, was of utmost importance. Before Strategic Air
Command (SAC) could commit the armada of B-52s, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and submarine-launched nuclear weapons into Russia to destroy their armed forces might, the U.S. military had to find the locations of those defenses and resources, and then determine the best way to destroy them. Relatively unknown others had to tread those unfriendly airways first.
It was the "reconnaissance crews-the intelligence collectors-that got the measure of the enemy well before the attackers [could] arrive. And they did so, as they always have and always will, under the shroud of rigidly enforced military security." 4 Signals intelligence, or SIGINT, played a key role during the Cold War. These included "radio and telephone communications, television pictures and radar beams" to name a few. 5 Strategic Air Command (SAC) tasked ISR assets to collect against the USSR during the Cold War. Their job was to "search for, intercept, identify, and locate or localize sources of intentional or unintentional radiated EM energy." 6 The purpose of SIGINT collection is to accumulate a variety of information about our nation's adversaries to save American lives in time of war by supplying the means to nullify the enemy threat. The role of ISR assets during the Cold War was to perform sensitive reconnaissance operations (SRO) support. There was no need to provide direct support to anybody on the ground during the Cold War area, so the ISR assets only provided information to support the strategic level intelligence community needs by collecting SIGINT. The main problem with this concept is that the special instructions (SPINS) already provide direction on the roles and responsibilities of aircrew during execution of the ATO.
Planners provide the crews with given direction on best orbit placement based on the collection priorities for that day's mission. In such instances as when a time sensitive target (TST), combat search and rescue (CSAR) or TIC emerged, the SPINS authorize aircrews to change orbit placement and orientation to support the higher priority mission. When aircrew made the deviation in support based off these standing SPINS, the proprietary personnel would interject criticism on a regular basis. Over time, this criticism turned into directive action and the changing or disregard of standing SPINS. The proprietary personnel had complete control of aircraft timing, collection, and dissemination. During a tactics conference that same month in the theater, EW personnel in attendance raised the issue of trying to control an ES platform from two thousand miles away, in a centralized control, centralized execution strategy. The proprietary personnel that attended the conference stated that aircrew did not know how to optimize their sensor collection and should leave orbit placement up to the planners. The proprietary personnel then informed the audience that operators were not capable enough to make tactical decisions that affected the course of the missions they participated in, due to their lack of the "Big Picture." They also stated that the crews did not have the authority or wherewithal to provide real-time, actionable intelligence directly to the ground forces, in an expeditious manner, even though the SPINS provided direct guidelines on priority of effort and the crews trained extensively to the ES direct support mission set.
9
Fortunately, during the conference out-brief with the combined forces air component commander (CFACC), the general agreed with the operators that the flexibility to adapt from a canned ISR mission to support an ES direct support was imperative. It was the CFACC's position that the SPINS will continue to reflect the need for the ES crews to adapt real-time to the ground situation, based off the specified priorities, and that the crews need only inform the proprietary personnel at the operations center of their actions. Despite the guidelines and CFACC approval, the proprietary personnel in the operations center continue to harass the crews, and the approved changes continue to disappear from the SPINS, only to be readdressed at the next tactics conference and SPINS meetings.
IV. Direct Support
"The most important tactical skill Airman will need in the 21 st Century will be the ability to rapidly acquire, develop, and share information across the Joint Force, and at all levels of warfare" -Lt Gen David A. The direct support provided by ES assets can simultaneously collect data for intelligence purposes meeting immediate tactical requirements, while also supporting the strategic level ISR intelligence requirements. This is because the intelligence collected and disseminated real time by the crews onboard the ES asset is processed by the appropriate parts of the intelligence community for further exploitation upon landing, supporting the ISR requirements. 11 According to AFDD 2-3, "Analysis requires that data from all the intelligence disciplines be brought together to the right people on a timely basis. This has proven in the past to be a substantial challenge because of technical problems associated with sharing data and security requirements. One of the benefits provided by ES platforms is their ability to collect and identify enemy SIGINT actions and then provide dissemination capabilities via voice, data links and chat. Parts of the battle management that ES platforms provide include the ability to augment packages on any variety of mission sets. ES platforms train and equip to find, fix, cross-cue, identify and disseminate pertinent information, tailored to the needs of the ground commander.
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The main limitation for support is the apportionment of ES and ISR forces, and the application of their differing capabilities to support the ground scheme of maneuver. When the ground commander requests a specific platform versus a needed capability, the proprietary personnel try to maximize quality support, while still getting the maximum quantity of collection capabilities.
Planners base the disposition of the LDHD ES platforms off a hierarchical supply and demand, apportioned according to Joint needs and requirements.
Where planners and operators fall into a contest of wills is when proprietary personnel take the quality and quantity of support out of the operator's hands, and the airborne crews The ES assets should not be limited to exclusively conducting strategic-level ISR missions when simultaneity maximizes ES capabilities and provides maximum support to the operational and tactical levels of war.
5) Education of the masses.
There must be a free flow of information and education between the ES/ISR platforms and the ground commander's representative, whether that is the JTAC in the field or the commander at the TOC. When it becomes an ad hoc liaison between ES platforms and pertinent ground personnel, the effectiveness of coordination and execution takes weeks to master. This is only after both sets of assets are coordinating real time in theater. One successful example of cross-education is that when the CCTs come through Al Udied AB, the RC-135V/W crews and CCTs in brief and out-brief each other before and after successful deployments. This tabletop discussion has maximized the cross-cue capabilities, and minimized the time required for successful cooperation in the field.
6) Improve thorough home station training for ES/ISR crews.
To successfully provide direct support, ES and ISR crews must be able to provide the pertinent information that the ground personnel need. They need to be proficient in CAS check-in procedures, what data is required to fulfill a CAS 9-line and where an ES asset can incorporate pertinent data and ES crews need to train stateside with the same type of personnel they will deploy in coordination with.
VI. Conclusion
ES assets provide the maximum capability to both the forces on the ground and the strategic through tactical-level ISR requirements, while conducting simultaneous ES and ISR roles. It is an intrinsic capability of ES assets to provide coincidental operational and tactical level support. The responsibility to provide the information, support and enhanced ES capability is not only on the aircrew that fly the ES assets, but also on the part of the proprietary personnel.
Those personnel must let loose the reins of control and trust the tactical level operators to maximize the support required by both the operational requirements and tactical level ground personnel in harms way.
If ES and ISR crews do not train to provide direct supporting actions while still supporting the ISR requirements, their ability to maximize the support at the operational and tactical levels of war diminish severely. When ES trained crews conduct strategic-level ISR only missions at the total expense of the ES direct support mission, as soon as the ES crews do need to plan and execute missions that require force packaging and tactical level support, they are unable to maximize their capabilities. Force packaging missions take place on a regular basis in theater.
The premise of force packaging is to place an ES asset in coordination with a battle management asset, such as an E-8 JSTARS. These platforms coordinate their actions in support of a task force to perform the given mission set. When planners marginalize the ES crews to the ISR role exclusively, those same ES crews are unable to provide support the truly ES mission set due to lack of proficiency and ability. This must not happen.
ES aircrews train to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance and turn the data into realtime, actionable intelligence, threat information and potential ITW, that they can provide directly to the ground forces, in an expeditious manner. The mission of electronic warfare support does not relegate the crews to only collecting the intentions of the enemy, but also for trend analysis and possible follow-on action. The real-time information that can warn a convoy about an impending ambush, the direct support to a combat controller that is under direct fire from multiple locations, and the ability to refine the identification and location of insurgents so that air and ground strikers have a more efficient kill chain, make up the tactical and operational significance of electronic warfare support. To deny one capability for the sake of another, limits the fighting capability of dedicated assets, and places friendly personnel in harm's way needlessly.
VII. Postlude

02NOV071130L:
Then the bomb hits the radios waves: "Jaguar 11, Jaguar 01, be advised Now that Jaguar 01 and Dude eliminated the immediate threat, the SF/ANA team was able to extract their two comrades from the vehicle, move to a safe distance and destroy the vehicle, preventing future use. Once this task was complete, the ground team continued their return to the FOB. As Python 76 continued to support the ground team, they built a ground picture of the team's surrounding area and their route back to the FOB. In addition to monitoring Jaguar 01, Python 76 correlated current intelligence with historical and pre-briefed data to determine the locations and intent of the enemy. More ACMs lay in wait, attempting to not only ambush the mobile ground team, but later that day, the FOB as well.
Once mobile, Jaguar 01 received numerous updates from Python 76 about another group of 12 to 15 ACMs tracking the ground team's movement. Based on these updates, the JTAC again directed an F-15E strike that neutralized at least five ACMs, foiling yet another ambush. Desperate to retaliate, the ACMs began to set up a mortar position close by, and again
Python 76 was able to queue the JTAC and F-15Es for a preemptive strike, this time not only eliminating enemy personnel, but destroying enemy munitions and attack capability. Following the foiled mortar strike, the enemy's overall ambush plan started to unravel. Python 76 was able to determine the enemy commanders' fixed location, which in turn, led to not only a guided munitions drop, but an F-15E strafing run that took out an ACM compound and an estimated 12-15 enemy personnel.
In total, the ES direct support mission resulted in providing effective, real-time dissemination of pertinent actionable intelligence directly to the ground commander, in support of irregular warfare. The final tally for the day included an estimated 45 to 60 enemy KIA. The enemy KIA weakened the insurgents in the area so drastically, that the warning of a likely, major attack by the Taliban in the area did not take place. More importantly, the SF-ANA team returned safely to their firebase that was now safe from the insurgent overrunning them.
02NOV071500L:
Python 76 remains on station, requesting the ability to extend coverage time to continue the support of the SF-ANA team. The operations center representative denies the request, as a different ES asset is coming on station, already fragged to continue the support.
The ES crew of Python 76 push northeast in the airspace of Afghanistan, to provide the required support to the strategic level ISR mission they are fragged to support for the next six hours. The crew is ready to support simultaneous ISR and ES mission sets, should another TIC or higher priority mission trump the collection deck requirements to support the ISR requirements. 
